Theme 1

Revolution, Evolution, or Devolution

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Welcome to this seminar. The people here mainly know each other, some for twenty-five years and longer. Some of us were meeting in the context of IDEE’s seminars on decommunization and nationalism or even more often at meetings of IDEE’s Centers for Pluralism. Certainly everyone knows about each other. The biographies are in the packet [see Appendix 1: Profiles of Seminar Participants on pages 173–178].

ERIC CHENOWETH
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We have a formal agenda of presenters and respondents, but the aim of the seminar is to provoke discussion, so I will keep people to their time limits to give as much opportunity as possible for your comments.

Our first presenter is Vincuk Viačorka, a longstanding leader of the Belarus independence and democracy movements. As a student, he launched samizdat publications and independent youth and civic initiatives starting in the early 1980s. In 1988 he helped to found, with Ales Bialiatski and others, the Belarus Popular Front, which was the foundation of that country’s independence and democracy movement and which he led as chairman from 1999 to 2007. He also helped initiate and has been active in many of Belarus’s most significant non-governmental organizations, including as chairman of the Supolnasc Civil Society Center, which was a very active member of IDEE’s Centers for Pluralism Network.

His respondent, Tunne Kelam, is one of the most important figures of the Estonian independence movement. An archivist by profession, he was active over decades in dissident and national groups. In August 1988, he helped found the Estonian National Independence Party. He was elected the first speaker of the Estonian Congress, the alternative parliament created in 1990, and was the deputy speaker of the first free Estonian parliament, known in Estonian as the Riigikogu, after its independence was restored in 1991, and served in that capacity until 2003. Since 2004, he has been a member of the European Parliament for the Pro Patria Union and remains a member of the party’s executive board. He is author of several books and photo-journals on the Estonian independence movement.
Presentation

Revolution, Evolution, or Devolution: The Case of Belarus

by Vincuk Viačorka

The subject of our panel—Revolution, Evolution, and Devolution—is an inclusive one, since all three occurred in succession in the countries of the region. I would like, however, to refine the subject: revolution and devolution of what? Where? To answer these questions, we must take notice not only of changes in the political mechanics of regimes, but first of all the changes in values shared by respective societies.

The overall subject of our seminar, reflections on the 25th anniversary of 1989, requires us to make generalizations. I will make some, but I will concentrate my discourse around Belarus, since the story of an unsuccessful transition may be more fruitful for our discussion’s outcome. The similarities and differences among the various national experiences represented here may then help better formulate some generalizations. I also cannot omit the Ukrainian tragedy and opportunity of today—for it is both. This too, requires a look back at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s.

In conversations with friends here from other countries—those, who, like me, participated in the events of that time—I sense that many feel they have lived through several epochs and now perceive the revolutions of 1989–91 as pre-history to their current situation. This is not the case of Belarus: too many changes we hoped for did not happen. Many people active from those times look at the events as being quite recent despite the generation-long distance in time.

There is another reason to focus on Belarus. From the outside, the situation today seems stable and quiet—the main focus of state propaganda is to convince the outside world that this is so. That external impression, however, might not reflect internal reality. As the revolutions twenty-five years ago showed and as the Ukrainian revolution demonstrates again, public aversion to dictatorship may erupt unexpectedly. A political turn towards democracy is possible even in difficult and seemingly hopeless cases.

The Preconditions of 1991

There is a presumption that Belarus regained its independence and its opportunity for democracy in 1991 simply by inertia and that therefore the Belarusian people took it for granted and never appreciated these political values sufficiently enough to defend them. The same presumption exists
about Ukraine: the people were not ready to build the new democratic statehood at the beginning of the 1990s and so this historical debt is being paid today with blood. But these presumptions are false: there were internal conditions to prepare for democratic change and independence in the then-Soviet and communist countries.

In Belarus, as in Ukraine, groups committed to the ideals of independence, human rights, and democracy re-emerged in the dissident period of the ‘60s to ‘80s. But these groups exploded in number and breadth beginning in 1985 (before, not because of, perestroika). Small but motivated groups committed to real values can at the right moment shift a whole society. This is what happened when these many groups came together to form the Belarusan Popular Front (BPF) movement in 1988.1

Grass-roots-level structures of BPF were quickly organized at the majority of enterprises, workplaces, universities, and other institutions. With such widespread organization, it was possible to channel the social demands of protesting workers in 1990–91 into a clear political agenda: first, the removal of Article 5 from the Constitution establishing the monopoly of Communist Party rule; second, the removal of Communist Party cells at workplaces; and third, significantly, full sovereignty (not just independence) of Belarus. On April 3, 1991, the second day of protests against price increases, crowds of workers on the streets of Minsk adopted these demands (prepared for them by me on a typewriter) and also adopted the white-red-white flag of independent Belarus.

In Soviet times, Belarus was regarded as one of the most “disciplined” of the so-called republics—as a zone of political and national stability having a relatively decent standard of living based on Soviet-style kolkhoz “welfare.” Still, even the ruling nomenklatura could not ignore the economic crisis. At the “last moment” before the collapse, the authorities introduced “self-financing” of enterprises and offered some opportunities for private initiative under control of the Komsomol. Nevertheless, everything contributing to the general crisis—the inefficient communist model; the inconsistency of reforms; the burden of the Afghanistan war; the Chernobyl disaster of 1986 (which affected one-third of Belarus ter-

1 In the summer of 1988, a booklet for restricted use only was distributed to all local secretaries of the Communist Party of Belarus titled “Some Actual Problems of Ideological Work in Current Conditions.” In it, the authors, high-level ideologists and KGB officers, described the so-called “informal antisocial groups” in Belarus and stressed that, even if they were obviously “puppets” of Western powers, “it is impermissible to underestimate them based on the paucity of their ranks.” Indeed, within three months, these “informal groups” had united themselves in the Belarusan Popular Front capable of mobilizing hundreds of thousands of people to the streets. — Author’s Note.
ritory); and the continuing giant reductions to the USSR budget with its
military appetite—all of these factors were too great for small “economic
improvements” to prevent the economic collapse.

Yet, beyond the economic preconditions, there was a flourishing cyn-
icism towards the communist regime mostly due to all of its depredations
of human dignity in Belarus as elsewhere—including the repression of
national identity. And among Soviet “republics,” Belarus had the strongest
policies aimed at marginalizing its national culture, language, and national
heritage.

The Unfinished Revolution and the Reversibility of Changes

The stage for achieving independence was set before 1991 with the
first partly free parliamentary election in Belarus. That took place in March
1990. Several dozen MPs were elected who were not approved in advance
by the Communist Party. The partly free elections were the result of two
years of street actions and information initiatives organized by the BPF.
Throughout the country, the active segment of society debated intensely
on all the alternative visions for further political development. The debate
over ideas of sovereignty and independence won over people’s hearts and
minds. And the general atmosphere in the Soviet Union was full of the
fresh air of change (an atmosphere that prevented the disoriented local
nomenklatura from taking radical steps to counter it).²

Out of 360 members in the Supreme Soviet, there were just 37 mem-
ers of the BPF faction. But at key moments, having the support of the
people rallying in the Square and the workers organizing strikes, the BPF
faction’s influence was decisive and received majority support in par-
liament. After the defeat of the Moscow putsch in August 1991, enough
members of the panic-stricken Communist Party majority voted for two
essential BPF legislative proposals: a constitutional legitimation of the
Republic of Belarus’s independence and a law outlawing the Communist
Party.

² The Russian term nomenklatura, used in all communist countries, refers spe-
icifically to the list of positions at all levels of the party-state apparatus to which
higher officials made appointments. Such appointments were based on member-
ship and loyalty to the Communist Party and recommendations made within the
hierarchy. More generally, the term nomenklatura refers to the political, econom-
ic, social, and security elite that ran the communist party-state and subsequently
to the part of the former elite that came to dominate political and economic power
in the post-communist period. For the term’s initial origins, see, for example, The
Nomenklatura: The Soviet Ruling Class by Mikhail Voslenksy (1984, Doubleday:
New York). — Editor’s Note.
The successful landing of Alexander Lukashenka in Belarusian politics in 1994 was possible because of several factors. These included the lack of vital reforms; society’s susceptibility to paternalism after 70 years of Soviet rule; and the inability of the politically active part of society to maintain necessary actions over time. But the most important factor was that the pro-democratic, pro-independence opposition was not allowed to exercise power: after 1991, it remained in opposition as post-communist structures continued to exert political dominance.

One key fork in the road was 1992. The Square couldn’t exercise pressure constantly. The Communist Party majority in parliament, still formed from the 1990 elections, reasserted itself to paralyze economic and social reforms and prevent institution building for an independent state. In this situation, the BPF initiated a referendum for early elections and changes in electoral legislation that could lead to the formation of a pro-democratic parliamentary majority. A half-million signatures were collected easily—twice the number needed under the existing constitution. But it was naïve to expect that the Supreme Soviet would follow the constitution. There was no mass campaign of street actions organized to back the demanded changes. The old nomenklatura took advantage of this quiet and the Supreme Soviet simply voted against holding a referendum and revoked the ban on the Communist Party.

It was in this simple and early manner that the devolution of 1988–91 began. The inconsistency of reforms led inevitably to a deeper economic crisis. Annual inflation in 1993 reached 2,000 percent. Although prices have risen 340 times under Lukashenka’s rule, the annual rate has been lower than in “the dark nineties”—the term he uses to describe this period. His rule, according to his arguments, is thus the lesser evil.

The democratic opposition could mobilize pressure only for partial reforms. It could not stop the corrupt process of privatization that benefitted the nomenklatura, nor could it successfully introduce social benefits for common people in the economic transition. Such initiatives, had they passed, would have earned some concrete recognition for the values-based democratic political groups beyond their moral political platform.

Belarus also remained in the economic and information space of Russia and Russian media were full of stereotypes about so-called “democrats in power.” Although the presence of democrats in Belarus was limited to the BPF’s small parliamentary faction together with some groups in local councils and a few deputy mayors, nevertheless the Russian media and the Communist faction was successful in painting the canvas such that the “democrats” were responsible for all of the bad changes taking place and for causing all of society’s new problems.
The democrats had another weakness as they faced Lukashenka’s candidacy and then his presidency. As they maneuvered this unsteady political situation, the democratic parties found themselves unable to build and keep coalitions among themselves or with the emerging civic sector.

There was, thus, an open field for the pro-Soviet populist Alexander Lukashenka’s political landing. Undoubtedly, he enjoyed financial and other support from Russia. It is also true, however, that the presidential elections he won in 1994 were almost free and fair—the first and last such elections. One may imagine that, as with other dictators, he enjoyed using democratic mechanisms to reach office in a situation where no mediating institutions existed to prevent his subsequent seizure of unlimited power.

**The Most Soviet Nomenklatura**

The challenge that arose for democratic movements everywhere in the region was how to resolve the problem of the post-Soviet nomenklatura. After the failure of the Moscow putsch in August 1991, the nomenklatura in nearly all the post-Soviet countries recovered from its initial shock to regain sufficient influence and strength to transfer state property to its private hands, all the while repainting its political colors in civilized hues.

Unlike in Ukraine, however, where an oligarchic model of limited democracy was established, in Belarus there was not even a “reformist” or at the least a clearly pro-independence wing of the nomenklatura. Lukashenka himself belonged to the younger generation and lowest nomenklatura level and therefore possessed even greater resentments and thirst of revenge over the “democrats in power.” Indeed, the old communist nomenklatura, with its greater pragmatism, was at first not utilized in the building of the Lukashenka regime. It was only over time that Lukashenka also included older generation functionaries to strengthen his hand.

Lukashenka’s underlying ideology and message was the restoration of Soviet-era “stability” and the preservation of a political space embracing Soviet “values.” Lukashenka did not even adopt the behaviors of such post-communist political leaders as President Algirdis Brazauskas in Lithuania or President Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine, who at least pretended to strengthen independent statehood and maintain a dialogue with democrats. One benefit of this lack of pretense was that the large majority of Belarusian democrats had no illusions about Lukashenka’s nature after 1994 and avoided the temptation of collaborating with this anti-democratic regime. This demarcation line held firm until 2007, after which a noticeable part of opposition parties unfortunately crossed the line to a more collaborative stance towards the dictatorship.
Cooperation with Neighbors: Mutual Inspiration

The period of 1989–91 was an inspiring epoque for international solidarity among democratic movements of all the Soviet-bloc’s captive nations. We remember with gratitude the support and understanding for Belarus’s pro-independence movement from Lithuania’s Sąjūdis; in turn, the BPF was the main organizer of solidarity actions with Lithuania, Latvia, and Georgia in response to Moscow’s open aggression against them. A lot of Belarusans participated in resistance actions in Vilnius when Gorbachev sent Soviet armed forces to attack Lithuania’s parliament in January 1991.3

The common values and goals shared by people in the countries of our region—restoring independence, rebuilding national and European (Western) identity, getting rid of communism—were real political capital. Unfortunately, that capital was never effectively used in the period of state-building. In the early 1990s, there were several conferences and round tables convened in Minsk and Kyiv at the initiative of BPF around the so-called Baltic–Black Sea Oil Collector, or corridor, which offered the possibility of using common practical instruments of new states in a Baltic–Black Sea alliance. But the initiative failed. (A major promoter of the Collector idea was Mykhailo Boichyshyn, the secretary of Ukraine’s pro-democracy independence movement, Rukh, who disappeared unexpectedly in January 1994 without a trace. His destiny remains unknown.)

After the first enthusiastic years of independence, countries in the region went along different paths. Regional cooperation among democratic forces, both those in power and those in opposition, steadily weakened. Democrats of one country had only a general idea about the situation in neighboring states. Particularism and relativism increased. An example of this is today the attitude adopted by the leaders of the Baltic States,

3 Lithuania had been the first of the Baltic States to reestablish independence in March 1990 by a formal act of the Supreme Council. After months of tension, on January 11, 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev ordered Soviet troops to seize the Lithuanian Press and TV tower and the Lithuanian parliament in order to reverse the Act on the Reestablishment of Independence. Elite Soviet forces, led by the Alpha Group, seized the Press Tower, killing 14 protesters and wounding 1,000. But tens of thousands of civilians, including from other countries, went to defend the parliament building, whose members, led by Supreme Council chairman Vytautas Landsbergis, refused to leave. After two days of standoff, the Soviet command ordered a withdrawal of its forces. The successful defense of Lithuania’s parliament building inspired independence movements in other republics to press for declarations of sovereignty and independence. Lithuania’s independence was recognized by the Soviet Union in September 1991 following the failed coup d’état against Gorbachev. — Editor’s Note.
Georgia, and even the new Ukrainian government towards Lukashenka as a newfound partner and defender of the value of independence. In the face of Vladimir Putin’s aggression in Ukraine, this may be understandable on a tactical level, but it is both morally obtuse and strategically short-sighted.

**The Role of Russia**

Russia’s chance for democracy at the beginning of 1990 was fleeting. The opportunity was real, but it could only have succeeded through a decisive break with Russia’s imperial past. That never happened.

The nations with long historical experience of subjugation under the Russian and Soviet empires looked at developments in Moscow with some, although not exaggerated hopes. But the coming to power of Vladimir Putin and his reassertion of KGB control returned Russia fully to its traditional anti-democratic and imperialist role. For Lukashenka, this turn of events destroyed his imagined chances to assume the Moscow throne in a revived Soviet commonwealth, a role he seriously hoped for during Yeltsin’s last years having some support among Russian communists and Slavophiles. The predictable turn of the Kremlin back towards imperial aggression—first against Georgia and now against Ukraine—has been a shock for Lukashenka. He grounded his regime on his loyalty to Russia. Unexpectedly, he no longer owns a monopoly on Soviet nostalgia. No doubt he and Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbayev, his colleague in the Eurasian Union, discuss the newfound threat felt to their rule from Moscow. Both, however, fear the revival of democratic society (itself the surest and most reliable guarantor of independence) more than Putin’s canines.

Vladimir Putin continues to back Lukashenka’s regime and its repressive actions, both in words and deeds, as part of an overall strategy to maintain the Russian Federation’s control over as many former “republics” of the Soviet Union as possible. In this regard, Moscow exacts a higher and higher price for its continued support of Lukashenka’s rule by increasing economic control over Belarusan enterprises—it is a further shortening of the leash that Putin holds the Belarusan ruler on.

**The Role of the West**

I will never forget my first contacts with Westerners at the end of the 1980s. The first persons I met were Scandinavian political analysts and journalists and they told us: “Только не мешайте Горбачёву! Don’t hinder Gorbachev.” Don’t be radical. Don’t demand decommunization or—what a terrible word to them!—independence for Belarus. Fortunately, there were no Western instruments of influence on us in those times and we did not pay attention to such advice. We continued with our “radical” aims and were supported in this by the majority of people.
More disillusioning for us, however, was the “Chicken Kiev speech” that US President George H. W. Bush gave on August 1, 1991. Just months before a December referendum in which Ukrainians overwhelmingly voted to withdraw from the Soviet Union, Bush cautioned his Kyiv hosts against “suicidal nationalism.” He urged “stable, and above all peaceful, change” and the key to this, he believed, was “a politically strong Gorbachev and an effectively working central structure.” Bush’s speech revealed the étatist approach of US and Western policy and a fundamental lack of trust in the people of the region. Many Western decision-makers were ignorant or disoriented on the issue of independence and ignored the strength and importance of pro-independence and anti-Kremlin democratic movements in all the “Soviet republics” as the driving forces for the transformative changes taking place in the region. These Western leaders were afraid of the independence movements and still paid all the credit to Gorbachev and Moscow for “democratic developments.”

Thus, it was not surprising that after the dissolution of the USSR and the removal of all nuclear weapons to the Russian Federation from the former “republics,” the newly emerged or restored states of the region (with the exception of the Baltic States) almost disappeared from the range of vision of large Western powers. One can see the result now of this disparaging attitude and neglect by Western leaders of the countries that restored their independence. The so-called Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances signed in 1994, which guaranteed territorial sovereignty in exchange for the transfer of all nuclear weapons from Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, is worthless as Russia carries out its aggression against Ukraine. These (and other) countries are still regarded as “New Independent States”—unlike Russia.

It is true that during the last decade Western institutions turned some slight attention to non-Russian post-Soviet countries as the Kremlin’s revanchism, beginning with the Georgian war, seemed to grow. There were various ideas on securing a European future for some of these countries, but in vain. The Eastern Partnership serves as an example of how a good idea may be devalued after passing through Brussels’s corridors. The initial concept was grounded in the belief that there was a necessity for the European Union to strengthen ties with and among six post-Soviet countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine). Realizing this idea, however, met many obstacles. There was an overestimation of the possibilities of cooperation with authoritarian states like Belarus and Azerbaijan; civil society’s role was marginalized by government-to-government relations; and the European Union adopted an approach of treating equally countries with highly differing levels of democracy.
And what of the West’s support for civil society? Its importance, both symbolic and practical, is vital and cannot be overstated. Unfortunately, since the late 1990s, with the beginning of systematized assistance from foreign donors, a dangerous virus began to spread within the structures of the emerging civil sector. This virus combined foreign insistence on two contradictory and counterproductive strategies. One was commercializing civic activism having the goal of making the NGO sector “self-sufficient” (called BONGOization, or making NGOs “business-oriented”). The other was requiring simultaneously unconditional obedience by NGOs to the donors and their vision for “transition.” This virus remains active in the veins of some Belarusan politicians (especially those who make a living in the civil sector).

What has this meant in practice? Today, a significant part of Western donors tie their financial assistance to the continued participation of the political and civic opposition in Lukashenka’s “elections,” which are simple spectacles that everyone knows are senseless. The result of such participation in these electoral stage performances has been to further compromise the opposition and, what is worse, weaken the resolve among the most pro-democratic parts of the society to resist.

**Europeans Convince Lukashenka?**

Many European policy makers have tried to convince Belarusan democrats that they can re-orient Lukashenka—using imaginary pro-Western “pigeons” within his clique—and that Lukashenka is the best hope for defending Belarus’s fragile independence against the neo-imperialism of the Russian Federation. Such wishful thinking flies in the face of nearly twenty years of Lukashenka’s entrenched dictatorship. This appeasement policy is often dictated not by any sincere feelings for Belarusan independence, but rather by the financial interests of neighboring EU businessmen who deal with the regime’s oligarchs.

As the recent experience of Ukraine shows, however, the geopolitical strategy of aligning Eastern European countries towards the European Union cannot be played with unreliable partners like Yanukovych—or Lukashenka. The latter has made clear that he will continue to sell Belarusan sovereignty, step by step, to Russia in exchange for an extension of his period of rule. Lukashenka cannot be considered a defender of independent statehood. Yanukovych’s shameful destiny should be sufficient proof that Western policy makers are wrong to believe that politicians who do not share democratic values will somehow move their countries away from Russia’s authoritarian reach and move towards democratic countries, Europe, and the Transatlantic Alliance.
There is another factor at work in the change of European policy, however. In Central and Eastern European countries, economic reform without effective lustration (restricting former communists from positions of political and economic power), allowed the nomenklatura to become economic elites with strong leverage to influence the politics of formally democratic countries. We in Belarus can see the effects by looking at the principal lobbyists for softening policies of the EU towards Minsk. They are often businessmen with old roots in the communist system. Indeed, the elites in Central and Eastern European countries now succumbing to Gazprom’s pressure appear to be of similar origin. The large presence of the high nomenklatura in political decision-making bodies and economic structures can easily lead to a compromise of national security and independence.

**Pillars of the Regime**

The Lukashenka regime’s resources for maintaining power are similar to that of Azerbaijan. Ilham Aliyev’s government uses social bribes by virtue of its oil and gas sales; for the Lukashenka regime, it is the price for transit of Russian oil and gas to Europe as well as the image Belarus retains as being Russia’s last ally in the region.

The regime in Belarus is effectively founded on fear: fear of arrest; fear of losing one’s job; fear for the future of one’s children (who can be dismissed from the university because of political disloyalty); fear of imprisonment if you are a small entrepreneur who does not share income with the authorities’ economic “inspectors”; fear of using one’s native Belarusian language (a sign of disloyalty in the face of the official campaign of Soviet-Russian nostalgia).

Another of the regime’s effective instruments is the destroying of people’s dignity. Obligatory rituals of loyalty (such as communist-style electoral stage performances) are deeply hated by the people but have been dutifully performed until recently. Young people, however, are by nature more sensitive to humiliation and to falsehood and are rejecting these rituals more and more. The authorities try to neutralize the growing self-awareness of the younger generation through use of raw power: brutalizing the most prominent leaders, controlling the internet, limiting cultural activities, and generally suppressing political speech.

**The Underdone Homework**

Belarusan society, just as the societies in Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, or Moldova, is ready for democracy.

In Belarus, foundations for electoral democracy exist in its older traditions and in its modern history. In its history, Belarusan politics, society and culture have many intellectual and democratic influences. There was
also a brief but tempestuous period of democratic statehood in 1918 that was snuffed out by Bolshevik Russia. The years of 1988–94 saw a democratic society and politics emerge out of decades of Soviet oppression. In 1994, Lukashenka used the mechanisms of democracy for coming to power before destroying all of them. Yet, even as Lukashenka imposed his dictatorship, the civil society built since 1985 continued to survive and foster the political values of democracy and independence. It is wrong to conclude that Belarusians have no democratic experience. Yet, the West now wrongly adopts the idea of introducing democracy to Belarus by the smallest doses over several generations, parcelled out under Lukashenka and his successors.

It is true that the era of relative democracy in Belarus was brief and there was a weak foundation for civic behavior to take deep roots. After the “adoption” of Lukashenka’s “directed democracy,” wise parents advised their children to play according to the rules, to join the BRSM (Lukashenka’s Komsomol), and to abide by other rituals of loyalty. It was easy for them to draw upon the memory of their own behavior in communist times. Yet, there is also a social layer of those 35 years old and above who came of age during the period of freedom—a cohort of citizens who would have much more chance for self-realization in a democratic Belarus.

We in Belarus must find a key to open the slammed door. The Lukashenka regime seeks to avoid this by preventing any kind of social self-organization and especially any self-organization on the basis of values of freedom and independence. Our opponents realize the role of democratic values in mobilizing people for change.

Beyond any economic crisis, which inevitably worsens, there is a line of tolerance beyond which the humiliation of individual dignity will not go and ultimately leads to a desperate fight for freedom. Such values as human dignity can mobilize people for change even more strongly than economic problems. This was proven in December 2010, when tens of thousands came to the streets not for any protest of economic conditions, but to register their opposition to electoral fraud. The people’s rising up in Ukraine, it should be remembered, was called the “Revolution of Dignity.”

Today, I see in the eyes of many young people in Belarus—those of the generation of our children—the same light as we had twenty-five years ago. It is the light of trust in freedom, democracy, independence, and truth. One of the most important tasks now is not to miss the chance to convey that mission to them and to have a value-based majority among younger generations.
Response

Tunne Kelam

I respond not to oppose anything Vincuk has said but to comment on his presentation. What Vincuk said is very important. It is not necessary for the political class to take the lead to make major changes in society. It is often the people who lead and the political class that follows.

I also agree with him when he said that all these developments are essentially about values.

The past twenty-five years have demonstrated that nothing is impossible. Everything is possible. Twenty-eight years ago, there was an army of professional Sovietologists assessing that the Soviet Union will continue to exist in the foreseeable future, despite its deepest crisis and changes on the ground. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union collapsed.

On the other hand, our experience also demonstrates that nothing is guaranteed. It is an old situation: people who brought about a change had the best intentions and noble goals, but as usual it ended in partial failure. The answer to why it was a partial failure is that revolutions, genuine changes, must start within the minds of people first, and only then can a political revolution succeed. In fact, in Eastern Europe, many people are still confused and don’t know the meaning of where we are actually going. The same could be said about our Western counterparts.

One thing is important to remember: it took two dictators to begin World War II. This fact is still not understood in Western Europe. The same applies for the post-war period. After 1945, there were two opposing international entities fighting each other. However, one has to ask, why did it take so long to bring the Soviet totalitarian system to self-defeat? Why did it not happen earlier? Maybe there were periods where these formally different systems developed a certain complementarity, in fact benefitting from each other, from the other side’s weaknesses and fears. It often boiled down to realpolitik pragmatism. The existence of an arch-enemy became in several ways a justification and support for one’s domestic policies. Such a political symbiosis provided a sort of false stability, but most importantly it kept the political leaders from committing themselves to strategic and morally directed decisions. A change came with Ronald Reagan, who realized that one has to exert strength before seeking compromises and agreements with your adversary.

There are still two basic models for conducting international relations and building society. One is based on the rule of law, in which members of a society benefit equally from basic rules and human rights. The other is dominated by corruption, usurping state institutions in the interests of the
Reflections on Unfinished Revolutions

few, cynically manipulating the rules, and blatant use of force. Generally, this second model benefits, as much as possible, from the pragmatic accommodation of the societies governed by rule of law, skillfully using the deviations it chooses to make from its own principles and values.

It is important to distinguish between rights and values. They are not necessarily the same. We mostly stand up for human rights, which is commendable. However, rights are no substitute for values, the latter being deeper and more important. These problems are not just relevant to dictatorships. They are even more important for democracies, which, as a rule, are facing the choice between a value-based long-term strategy and more pragmatic short-term approaches. The first choice means responsibility and statesmanship. The political scope of the second usually extends until the next elections, with politicians strongly inclined to self-serving compromises at the expense of fundamental values.

Recently, the new candidate for the post of the EU’s High Representative for foreign and security policy, Federica Mogherini, called for a “balanced approach” towards Russia and its Eastern neighbors. Can we really achieve a “balanced approach” between aggression and continuing normal relations? Sadly, until now, the reaction of the European Union shows that aggression can be profitable. You can seize foreign territories, expand your state by using military force, violate international commitments, and despite all this enter peace talks as equal partners. Nobody can oppose peace talks, but these cannot become a goal in itself, substituting for the damage caused by aggression. The harsh fact remains that for the peacemakers the price of the bargain usually includes accepting the gains of the aggressor. True, the annexation of Crimea will not formally be recognized as legal, but in practice a big European state has been dismembered.

Appeasement or accommodation to aggression has helped dictatorships in the past. The risk of appeasement has not vanished today. Democratic politicians have experienced and still continue to have major difficulties with how to deal with thugs and this is especially so when the thug has usurped the title of a head of state. Once again, this is about a clash of values and different approaches: thugs relying on force and intimidation; the Western leaders on the respect of law and on efforts to achieve peace through compromises. When trying to combine two mutually exclusive approaches, it is easy to cling to the hope that thugs can be changed by negotiating with them, that they can become more civilized and finally be integrated into the rule of law framework.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the change of regimes that started twenty-five years ago show that people, too, can make a difference. People who are prepared to make a change can make changes. But the change
initially must begin in the minds of the oppressed citizens. I was always impressed by Solzhenitsyn’s famous essay “Live Not By Lies.” One meets the same challenge today. We prefer to lie to ourselves assuming that dictators can be enlightened, that they can become more moderate, and that they can finally realize by themselves the advantages of rule of law. The usual argument is based on realpolitik: the real situation mandates us to deal with these leaders, and since they exist, one must somehow come to terms with them. But that is just today’s formal reality. There also exists tomorrow’s latent reality that is created and supported by individuals and groups who think differently. Why is it so hard to understand? The foundation of any democracy is the possibility to choose between genuine alternatives: to change the existing reality or not.

What prepared the change in the Soviet space twenty-five years ago? In countries like Poland, it was the upsurge of values-based, spiritual forces, which concentrated around the person of Pope John Paul II and his message: “Do not be afraid!” Social groups had been split for decades. Previously, workers went on strike and intellectuals remained passive; the next time, intellectuals were repressed and workers abstained. Under the inspiration of John Paul II, they all became united in the common quest for truth, dignity, and justice. This common quest soon became a new reality, bringing about a qualitative change.

If we speak about creating a new reality, one can remind ourselves also of the period in Western Europe in the years between 1945 and 1950. It was a period of post-war crisis. A new world war loomed large. The Soviet Union was preparing to conquer the rest of Europe, which had plunged into deep economic and social crisis. Suddenly some people like Robert Schuman came up with a stunning idea: instead of fighting one another, cooperation; instead of exclusiveness, sharing. His idea was to share the same economic benefits on an equal footing, beginning by sharing strategic resources like coal and steel. It was a wonderful idea that became possible because it was built on a foundation of rule of law that prevented the rise of dictatorship. And it worked. The current European Union is often criticized, however no one can deny the fact that the formal cooperation of twenty-eight nations has created a new quality in European relations, one that excludes the use of force to resolve differences and organize relations—a first in the continent’s history.

As a student I had a chance to study under a well-known professor of art history. I was impressed that he had traveled throughout Europe in the 1930s to see with his own eyes the great cathedrals and masterpieces of art. It was of course something impossible for me to imagine as we both were by that time separated from Western Europe by the Iron Curtain. My professor was interested in politics and listened to Western radio broad-
casts. The European Common Market had just been established. Soviet propaganda labeled it as a conspiracy of imperialist monopolies that was ultimately doomed to fail. However, my professor’s experience of European culture allowed him to believe that the opposite would happen, that in the end the European countries would overcome their national differences and find a mutually beneficial solution, based on their common cultural heritage and spiritual values. This was the biggest qualitative change in European history. A new reality was built. Why is it still so difficult to imagine that other realities will become true?

Creating New Realities

I return to events in Estonia under Soviet occupation. Fledgling patriotic-democratic groups started with the idea to present an alternative to the existing communist-dominated reality. Election results seemed to prove that 99.9 percent of the Soviet people supported the communist dictatorship. These figures looked like reality. Out of this “reality” two underground groups decided to send a signal that the supposed uniformity of support for the Soviet system was false, that there were people who thought and felt differently. In 1972, I and a group of dissidents smuggled a petition to the United Nations. It contained two demands: the evacuation of Soviet troops from Estonia (whose occupation was a fundamental violation of international law) and UN assistance to organize free elections. At the time, such demands sounded absolutely crazy. The point, however, was not to get a formal answer from the UN Secretary General, but rather to signal Western public opinion that there are people who have not accommodated to the reality of violence and lies, who insist on Estonia’s right to correct the historical injustice done to her, restoring her independent statehood. Despite ferocious KGB backlash, and partially even thanks to it, we succeeded in our aim: to show that the Soviet Union was violating the same basic human rights that Mr. Brezhnev pledged to respect a few years later in the Helsinki Accords.4

4 Discussions for a security cooperation treaty had begun with the Helsinki Consultations in 1972 and continued after the opening of the formal Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in July of 1973. Throughout there were intense negotiations as to inclusion of human rights provisions and finally the Soviet Union agreed to accept a Basket III of the accords, which pledges signatories to respect specific human rights protected under international law and UN covenants. The Helsinki Final Act, or Helsinki Accords, was signed on August 1, 1975 by every European country (except Albania) as well as the United States and Canada. After it was signed, the agreement became the inspiration for the establishment by dissidents in the Soviet bloc countries of Helsinki Committees or Helsinki Watch Groups that monitored violations by communist governments of their obligations under the Accords. — Editor’s Note.
Estonia, starting in 1987, became an interesting hotbed of citizens’ democratic initiatives. At that time, a clear majority of people living in the Soviet-occupied Baltic States assumed that reforms could only come from the “enlightened” wing of the Communist Party. It was the only organized political force in living memory. Despite its ongoing ruthlessness, many believed that the reformist and moderate new Communist Party leader Mikhail Gorbachev would bring about changes, including more national and cultural autonomy. The condition, of course, was that the Baltic nations would accept the results of their illegal annexation to the Soviet Union. However, numerous Estonians had doubts about such supposed changes and started to look for alternatives.

Estonian patriots began with an open-air political demonstration on August 23, 1987, the anniversary of the signing of the notorious Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. It was the first formally registered open-air demonstration since 1940 and surprisingly it brought together about 3,000 participants. They did not yet ask for freedom. Instead, they presented a quest for the truth. They demanded the truth be openly revealed about the secret protocols of the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and their impact on the Baltic nations.\(^5\) The Western press was informed in advance and a group of US senators sent a letter to Gorbachev presenting the forthcoming demonstration as a test of his more open policy. The Soviet security forces abstained from carrying out a planned clamp-down.

In August 1988, a group of patriots founded an opposition political party called the Estonian National Independence Party (ENIP). It offered a clear alternative political and economic vision based on international law. ENIP happened to be the first democratic non-Communist political party on the territory of the Soviet Union. It meant breaking the historic taboo of the sacred monopoly of the Communist Party. As no serious repressions followed, the result was a mushrooming of new political parties not only

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\(^5\) The secret protocols formally divided Eastern Europe into “spheres of influence” between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union and allowed for Hitler to start World War II with the invasion of Poland and for the Soviet Union to occupy and annex territories of eastern Poland and the Baltic States, among others. Until December 1989, the government of the USSR did not acknowledge the existence of the treaty’s secret protocols and the official Kremlin line remained that the occupation of the Baltic States was a preventive step and also that in July 1940 the “parliaments” of the Baltic States, which had been formed on the basis of a single list of pro-Soviet candidates and “elected” in conditions of KGB terror, “requested” to be annexed by the USSR. In November 2014, Vladimir Putin officially defended the Pact on the same grounds as communists had done for decades as “the rightful policy of Stalin to avoid fighting”—again ignoring the aggressive military actions of the Soviet Union to invade its neighbors. — Editor’s Note.
in Estonia but also elsewhere in the Soviet Union. National independence parties were formed also in Georgia, Latvia, and even Tatarstan.

1989 became the year of a crucial breakthrough. In February, three patriotic movements in Estonia (including ENIP) started a citizens' committee movement. They called on all people who were citizens of the independent Republic of Estonia at the moment of its occupation in 1940 and their descendants, who were automatically citizens by Estonian law, to register themselves as such. Within one year, what started as an idealistic action lacking resources and access to mass media and also facing hostility by government authorities and pro-Soviet reformists became the biggest citizens’ initiative in the country’s history. Despite the ever-present threat that declaring oneself to be a citizen of independent Estonia by one’s own signature while being de facto a Soviet national could mean signing up for a deportation train, 790,000 persons signed such a declaration, an enormous figure given that 40 percent of Estonia’s 1.5 million population at that time was made up of Soviet-era immigrants and army personnel. In fact, this citizens’ initiative became an authoritative and powerful referendum in favor of the restoration of genuine national independence. Even the communists started to jump on the bandwagon and in the spring of 1990 the Estonian wing of the local communist party quietly imploded.

In February 1990, registered Estonian citizens elected an alternative parliament, the Congress of Estonia. It represented the widest possible democratic spectrum of Estonian political forces with 33 different parties and movements. The Congress declared its authority over fundamental issues of statehood and citizenship.

So what happened in Estonia? Starting from 1988, the Soviet authorities were no longer able to control the pace of events. Instead, they were limited to reacting to citizens’ initiatives, lagging more and more behind the stream of changes that accumulated a new political quality. Within two years the paradigm of the Estonian people changed dramatically. From accepting the Communist Party as the only legitimate source of political change, they came to believe that only an independent Estonia could bring about real reforms. What had begun in 1972 as an attempt to oppose the monopoly of the Soviet dictatorship by a small group of citizens, culminated by 1990 in a pivotal transformation in the minds of people. The alternatives that they created prepared themselves—politically, legally, and morally—for the arrival of true independence. Thanks to the Congress of Estonia, all was prepared in a democratic way to escape from the Soviet Union and re-join the West once the opportunity came. This happened in August 1991. Prepared by the citizens’ initiatives of 1987–91, Estonia was ready to carry out radical reforms without wasting time, reforms that took the nation to the West and to membership in the EU and NATO.
Discussion

CHARLES FAIRBANKS
Member of the Board of Directors, IDEE

In both of the presentations, there was a useful emphasis on the importance of the events in Ukraine. But I would like to state a more definite thesis about their importance. After 1989, we see the countries of the former Soviet bloc going in very different directions—from Poland at one extreme, considered the freest and most successful, to Turkmenistan, the deepest tyranny. But in terms of time, if we conduct an exercise in periodization, which is the favorite term of Soviet historians, there were two general periods and now a third. The first period was one of tremendous evolution and uncertainty of the direction countries would go in and how free they would become. This lasted until the mid- to late-1990s, when there was still a question about countries like Slovakia and those in the Balkans as to what path they would take. Then there was a period of consolidation, where there were some patterns emerging of free and unfree countries, but there was a potential still for evolution for the unfree countries, mostly due to the fact that they had become independent and the West maintained a belief in the international order by which countries’ independence was protected—an order it was obliged to defend.

Now, there is a third period, with the full return of Russian imperialism. Here, there is a danger that the issue of freedom for the whole former Soviet space, except the Baltic States, will be frozen by a combination of Western indifference to Russian power and the exercise of that power, whether it is exerted directly as in places like Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transdniester and now Crimea, or indirectly by creating frozen conflicts that prevent countries from evolving in a democratic direction. That is a danger of this completely new phase that is now beginning.